Megan\u27s Law and Its Progeny: Whom Will the Courts Protect? by Hindman, Robert R
Boston College Law Review
Volume 39
Issue 1 Number 1 Article 5
12-1-1998
Megan's Law and Its Progeny: Whom Will the
Courts Protect?
Robert R. Hindman
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert R. Hindman, Megan's Law and Its Progeny: Whom Will the Courts Protect?, 39 B.C.L. Rev. 201 (1998),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol39/iss1/5
MEGAN'S LAW AND ITS PROGENY:
WHOM WILL THE COURTS PROTECT?
INTRODUCTION
On July 30, 1994, Jesse Timmendequas of Hamilton Township,
New Jersey, lured seven-year-old Megan Kanka into his home where he
brutally raped her and strangled her to death.' What made this crime
so shocking and outrageous was that Megan's alleged killer was pre-
viously convicted of two sex offenses against children and lived anony-
mously in a house across the street from the Kankas, along with two
other convicted pedophiles.' The Kankas and their neighbors were
unaware that convicted sexual predators lived in their neighborhood.'
The public outcry to this horrific crime was immediate.' Just three
months after Megan's murder, New Jersey Governor Christine Todd
Whitman signed one of the toughest sex offender registration acts into
law.' The circumstances surrounding this crime and the feeling that it
could have been prevented brought national attention to the issue of
how to deal with released sex offenders.' Congress responded to the
public outrage by including special provisions in the Federal Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to protect children
from sex offenders.? This law requires states to adopt programs that
protect the public against violent sex offenders.' Released sex offend-
ers and those who commit crimes against children must register with
local law enforcement agencies and notify authorities of any change in
address.' In addition, the law allows authorities to disseminate infor-
mation to the public necessary for their protection.°
See G. Scott Rafshoon, Comment, Community Notification of Sex Offenders: Issues of Punish-
ment, Privacy, and Due Process, 44 EssoRY U. 1633, 1633 n.1 (1995). The little girl was lured away
with the promise of seeing a puppy. See id. Once inside the house, her murderer strangled her
with a belt, sexually assaulted her, wrapped her head in a plastic bag, put her in a toy box and
cut her shorts into pieces. See id.
9 See Simeon Schopf, "Megan's Law": Community Notification and the Constitution, 29 CoLum.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 117, 117 (1995).
5 See id.
4 See Ryan A. Boland, Note, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Protection,
Not Punishment, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 189, 183-84 (1995).
I See id.
See Schopf, supra note 2, at 117.
See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
A 170101, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
See id.
9 See id.
I" See id. § 170101 (d).
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In one incident, a teacher's aide who learned of the presence of
a sex offender in the community because of the new law, noticed the
offender and reported to the police that he had been in contact with
a child." The police subsequently learned that the registered offender
had attended a child's birthday party and had invited a nine-year-old
to his home for ice cream. 12 In this instance, the law may have saved a
child from the horrific trauma of sexual assault or even may have saved
the child's life.
Controversy surrounds the provision in the law requiring commu-
nity notification.' 3 Opponents argue that it violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the United States Constitution ("Constitution") because the
notification provisions constitute punishment." Proponents of the
community notification requirement assert that it is an injustice that
the offender is .allowed to start his life anew while the victim's family
must live with the emotional trauma that follows in the wake of the
sexual offense.' 5 Moreover, the proponents argue that victims must face
the reality that the crime may have been prevented had the victims
been aware of the presence of the sex offender in their community. 15
This Note will examine some of the constitutional concerns posed
by several state sexual registration acts as interpreted by state and
federal courts.' 7 In each of these cases the courts decided whether the
registration and notification provisions of the statute, when retroac-
tively applied, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.' 5
The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on this issue. There-
fore, state and federal courts are applying different tests, resulting
in conflicting outcomes. 19 Some courts have used the test set forth by
the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez in determining
whether the acts applying the statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause
of the Constitution. 2° Others have used a test composed of various
" See Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
IS See id.
13 See Schopf, supra note 2, at 118.
14 See id. at 136. See generally U.S. CONST., art. 1., § 9, cl. 3, § 10, cl. 1.
15 See Schopf, supra note 2, at 136.
"See id.
17 See infra notes 73-264 and accompanying text.
18 See id.
"See, e.g., Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996) (Artway II); Doe v. Weld, 954
F. Supp. 425 (D. Mass. 1996); Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); W.P. v. Poritz, 931
F. Supp. 1199 (D.NJ. 1996); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994); Doe v. Poritz,
662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994).
20 See Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F.
Supp. 666, 673 (D.NJ. 1995), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); Rowe,
884 F. Supp. at 1378; Ward, 869 P.2d at 1068. See generally Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
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factors, such as intent and effects, gathered from previous cases." After
analyzing the totality of the circumstances encompassed in the various
cases, this Note will demonstrate that the punitive effects of the acts,
if any, were minor and incidentaf. 22 That is, any punitive effects expe-
rienced by the registrants did not rise to the degree necessary to
override the statutes' regulatory purpose." Part I of this Note examines
the compulsive nature of sex offenders and their susceptibility to re-
offend." Part II explores ex post facto analysis." Part HA. discusses
Mendoza-Martinez which has been interpreted as establishing a frame-
work for determining whether a statute constitutes punishment. 26 Part
II.B. traces the development of ex post facto challenges to the several
sex offender registration statutes and the application, and subsequent
rejection, of the Mendoza-Martinez test. 27 Part II.C. explores the defini-
tion of punishment as set forth in United States u Ursery.28 Part III
examines the varied tests applied by the several courts and the corre-
sponding conflicting results and argues that the state statutes pass
muster under any of the tests mentioned." Part IV develops a proposed
framework for the courts to follow when deciding whether a sex of-
fender registration statute constitutes punishment and thus fails an ex
post facto challenge."
I. REPETITIVE AND COMPULSIVE BEHAVIOR
Sex offender recidivism presents a serious problem. 31 Seven to
35% of rapists re-offend and between 10% and 40% of child molesters
repeat their offense." In contrast to other criminals, sex offenders'
propensity to commit offenses doès not decrease over time." Many of
those who commit a second offense do so after a long interval without
21 See supra note 20. The Mendoza -Martinez test looks at seven factors to determine if the
statutes have punitive effects. See 372 U.S. at 168-69; infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
22 See. W.P, 931 F. Supp. at 1219; Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073; infra notes 274-340 and accompa-
nying text.
23 See W.P, 931 F. Supp. at 1219; Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073; infra notes 274-340 and accompa-
nying text.
24 See infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text. See generally Mendoza -Martinez, 372 U.S. at
168-69.
27 See infra notes 73-218 and accompanying text. See generally Mendoza -Martinez, 372 U.S. at
168-69.
" See infra notes 219-64 and accompanying text. See generally United States v. Ursery, 116 S.
Ct. 2135,2147 (1996).
" See infra notes 265-3i4 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 315:40 and accompanying text,
31 See Doc v. POritz, 662 A.2d 367,374 (N4. 1995).
32 See id.
33 See id.
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offense 34 One study showed that 48% of recidivistic sex offenders
committed a similar crime within five years after their release, while
52% repeated during the following seventeen years." Treatment of sex
offenders rarely succeeds." In New Jersey, the Department of Correc-
tion's statistics show that during the period from 1980 to 1994, only
182 inmates were paroled from the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment
Center, while 712 inmates were not released until they had served their
maximum sentences." These statistics demonstrate that a majority of
sex offenders are not successfully rehabilitated."
Similar studies have shown that sexual crimes are common." A
Justice Department study found that 133,000 women in the United
States, age twelve or older, were victims of rape or attempted rape
during the period from 1987 to 1991. 1° The study showed that 44%, or
approximately 59,000, of these offenses were committed by strangers. 41
The study also found that 21% of the total assaults involved weapons
and 47% of all victims (60% of which were committed by strangers)
sustained injuries other than the rape itself. 42 The Justice Department
also reported that in 1988, as many as 4600 children of both sexes were
abducted or detained by nonfamily members, nearly all by force (80%
to 85%) and usually with a weapon (75% to 85%). 13 The report found
that more than two-thirds of these victims were sexually assaulted. 11 The
Justice Department found, in 1992, that nearly 17,000 girls under age
twelve were raped-54% by nonfamily members.45
Another Justice Department study found that, as a group, sex
offenders are significantly more likely than other recidivistic criminals
to re-offend with sex crimes or other violent crimes and that the
tendency to re-offend persists over time." The study showed that re-
leased rapists were 10.5 times more likely to be rearrested for rape than
were other released prisoners. 47 The study also found that prisoners
who were convicted of other sexual assaults were 7.5 times more likely
34 See id.
" See id.
58 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 374.
37
 See id.
58 See id.
38 See id. Data that is available show that the impact of such crimes is substantial and
widespread. See id.
40 See
41 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 374.
42 See id.
45 See id. at 374-75.
44 See id. at 375.
45 See id. at 374.
48 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 375.
47 See id.
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to be rearrested for sexual assault than were other released prisoners.' 8
Moreover, the study showed that recidivism rates do not appreciably
decline over time and thus, in contrast with other types of offenders,
the tendency to re-offend does not appear to decline with the of-
fender's increasing age.49 It has been estimated that nonfamily child
molesters have an average of 19.8 victims for those molesting girls and
150 victims for those molesting boys. 5°
II. TRADITIONAL Ex POST FACTO LAW
In enacting the sex offender registration statutes, with their atten-
dant community notification provisions, state legislatures have come
under fire from civil rights activists challenging the constitutionality of
the statutes." The Constitution provides that no state or federal gov-
ernment shall pass any ex post facto law." The United States Supreme
Court has stated that the prohibition against ex post facto laws prevents
state legislatures from passing laws after an act has been committed by
a citizen punishing the citizen for that act." The Constitution's prohi-
bition against ex post facto laws encompasses every law that makes an
otherwise innocent act criminal, solely because the law was passed after
the act was performed, and also encompasses every law that aggravates
a crime or snakes it greater than it was when committed." In addition,
the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to every law that changes punishment
and inflicts greater punishment than was annexed to the crime when
committed and applies to every law that alters the legal rules of evi-
dence, allowing less or different testimony to convict the offender than
the law required when the act was committed." Thus, an ex post facto
law must be retrospective. 56 Not all retrospective laws, however, are ex
post facto laws. 57 Only retrospective laws that take away, or impair,
citizens' rights under existing laws are unjust. 55
45 See id.
49 See id.
" See id.
5 ' See, e.g., Ariway II, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603 (S,D.N.Y.
1996).
52 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3, § 10, cl. 1. Article I of the Constitution reads in relevant
part that "Mo.... ex post facto [flaw shall be passed" and "kilo State shall pass any ... ex
post facto [flaw ... ." Id.
53 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
54 See id.
55 See id.
" See id. at 391.
57 See id.
" See Calder, 3 U.S. at 391.
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A. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez: A Test to Determine the Penal
Nature of a Statute •
The Supreme Court has yet to promulgate a test or framework to
determine whether a statute constitutes punishment in the ex post
facto context; therefore, when ruling on ex post facto challenges to
the sex offender registration statutes, several lower courts, both state
and federal, have relied instead on Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.59 In
1963, in Mendoza Martinez, the United States Supreme Court held that
statutes divesting an American of his or her citizenship for leaving or
remaining outside the country during a time of war or national emer-
gency violated the Constitution because they did not allow the protec-
tions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution. 6° The
Court framed the issue as whether the statutes—which automatically
imposed forfeiture of citizenship without prior proceedings—were es-
sentially penal in nature, depriving the appellees of their citizenship
without due process of law and without according them their rights
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 61
The Court found the sanction punitive in nature using the tests
traditionally applied to determine the penal or regulatory nature of
an act of Congress. 62 The Court stated that the relevant inquiry to
determine whether an act was punitive included seven factors.° First,
the Court determined whether the sanction involved an affirmative
disability or restraint. 64 Second, the Court asked whether it historically
had been regarded as punishment. 65 Third, the Court decided whether
the sanction requires a finding of scienter. 66 Fourth, the Court deter-
mined whether its operation promoted the traditional aims of punish-
ment, namely retribution and deterrence. 67 Fifth, the Court considered
whether the behavior to which the sanction applied was already a
crime.° Sixth, the Court asked whether an alternative purpose existed
to which it may rationally be connected.° Seventh, the Court deter-
59 See Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F.
Supp. 666, 673 (lin 1995), affd in part, vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); Rowe v.
Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Alaska 1994). See generally Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144 (1963),
50 See 372 U.S, at 164, 186.
61 See id. at 164.
62 See id. at 168.
63 See id. at 168-69.
"See id. at 168.
65
 See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168.
56 See id
67
 See Id.
68 See id.
65
 See Id, at 168-69.
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mined whether the statute appeared excessive in relation to that alter-
native purpose." The Court initiated this analysis only in the absence
of conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the statute's penal
nature.71 The Supreme Court concluded that if the evidence indicated
a legislative intent to punish, the statute would constitute punishment
and thus violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution."
B. Mendoza-Martinez as Applied to Sex Offender Registration Statutes
In 1994, using the Kennedy v. Mendoza Martinez test, the Supreme
Court of Washington, in State v. Ward, held in relevant part that Wash-
ington's Community Protection Act of 1990 ("CPA"), when applied
retroactively, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitu-
tion." In Ward, appellants Jeffrey Ward and John Doe, two convicted
sex offenders required to register under the CPA, challenged the
statute's validity under the Ex Post Facto Clause. 74 Both appellants
committed their crimes prior to the passage of the CPA." The CPA
requires all persons residing in Washington who were convicted of any
sex offense to register with their county sheriff." The CPA authorizes
agencies to release to the public relevant and necessary information
regarding offenders when necessary for public protection. 77
The court, relying on Mendoza-Martinez, found that the CPA did
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it did not constitute
punishment." First, the court found that collecting information from
registrants and requiring them to fill out the requisite form did not
7° See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S, at 169.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 164, 186. The Court applied the seven factors to the statutes hi question and
found the statutes to be punitive. See id. at 169.
73 869 P.2d 1062, 1074 (Wash. 1994). See generally Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144.
74 See Ward, 869 P.2d at 1066.
75 See id. at 1065, 1066.
" See WAsn. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.130(1) (West 1996). The Community Protection Act
("CPA") requires the offenders to provide their name, address, date and place of birth, place of
employment, date and place of conviction, aliases used and social security number. See id.
Registrants also have to notify the county sheriff of any change of address within the county. See
id. § 9A.44.130(2). Furthermore, if the registrant moves to a new county, he or she has to
re-register. See id. § 9A.44.130(4).
77 See id. § 4.24.550(1). The legislature found that overly-restrictive confidentiality and liabil-
ity laws governing the release of registrant information reduced the willingness to release infor-
mation, thus endangering the public. See Ward, 869 P.2d at 1070. Therefore, the legislature's
policy, as expressed in the CPA, was to require exchange of relevant information about sexual
predators among public agencies and to authorize the release of necessary and relevant informa-
tion about sexual predators to the public. See id.
7° See Ward, 869 P.2d at 1066. The court used four of the factors implicated by the appellant's
argument. See id.
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create an affirmative disability or restraint. 79 In addition, the court
noted that the statute limited when an agency could disclose registrant
information, what information could be disclosed and where it could
be disclosed.8° Because the legislature thus restricted dissemination of
registrant information to the public, the court stated that the statute
did not impose additional punishment.81
Second, the court considered whether the statute's requirements
historically constituted punishment.s 2 The court determined that reg-
istration was a traditional governmental method that provided neces-
sary information to the proper law enforcement agencies. 83 Third, the
court considered whether registration promoted the traditional aims
of punishment, namely retribution and deterrence. 84 The court rea-
soned that conviction and punishment for the offense may deter a
registrant from committing future offenses regardless of the registra-
tion requirement; therefore, registration did not increase deterrence
by any significant amount. 83 The court further stated that law enforce-
ment agencies, as well as the general public, were the intended
beneficiaries of the law because it assisted them in protecting their
communities by providing access to relevant and necessary informa-
tion.86 Even if registration incidentally deterred future crimes, the
court refused to construe the statute's purpose as punitive in nature. 87
Fourth, the court balanced the burden of registration against its non-
punitive purpose—public protection—and concluded that the burden
of registration did not outweigh the benefit of public protection. 88
After weighing these factors, the Supreme Court of Washington held
that the Community Protection Act did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause because it was nonpunitive.89
Arriving at a different result than Ward, the United States District
Court for the District of Alaska, in 1994, in Rowe v. Burton, held in part
that the community notification provisions of the Alaska Registration
Act ("Registration Act"), imposed retroactively, would likely violate the
79 See id. at 1069,
80 See id. at 1069-70. The public warning can contain only the information "relevant and
necessary" for protection of the public. See id. at 1070. The notifying agency may only disclose
information in a geographic area rationally related to the threat posed by the registrant. See id.
" See id. at 1069.
82 See id. at 1072.
85 See Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
84 See id.•
85 See id,
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See Ward, 869 P.2d at 1074.
89 See id.
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Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution." The court thus granted a
preliminary injunction against public dissemination of the plaintiffs'
registration information. 9 ' The court implicitly found that the Regis-
tration Act had a punitive effect, despite its declared regulatory pur-
pose.92
In Rowe, convicted sex offenders brought an action challenging
the constitutionality of the Registration Act and sought a preliminary
injunction. 93 The Registration Act requires a person convicted of a sex
offense in Alaska or in another jurisdiction to register with local
authorities within seven days following their release from incarcera-
tion, or within fourteen days of arriving in Alaska." The Registration
Act also provides for a central registry of sex offenders maintained by
Alaska's Department of Public Safety. 99 It guarantees the confidentiality
of some information, but allows for public disclosure of certain facts,
including the offender's name, address and photograph. 99 The plain-
tiffs claimed that the Registration Act was an ex post facto law and thus
violated the Constitution. 97
In determining whether the Registration Act had a punitive effect,
the court used the test established in Mendoza-Martinez." The court
reasoned that the Registration Act, by providing for public dissemina-
tion of information, subjected the registrants to public stigma and
ostracism that affected both their personal and professional lives." The
court thus concluded that the Registration Act imposed an affirmative
disability or restraint on the plaintiffs.'"
90 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1378, 1380 (D. Alaska 1994).
°I See id. at 1388.
92 See id. at 1379, 1350.
93 See id. at 1375.
94 See ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010(a) (Michie 1997). To comply with the registration require-
ment, the sex offender must complete a form stating the offender's name, address, place of
employment, date of birth, convicted offense(s), date of conviction(s), place and court of con-
viction(s), aliases and driver's license number, See id. § 12.63.010(b)(1). When a registrant's
address changes, the offender has to provide written notice within 10 days. See id. § 12.63.010(c).
The duty to register continues for a minimum of 15 years after a conviction for a registrable
sexual offense and possibly could continue for life. See id. § 12.63.020. Duration of the duty to
register for one-time offenders is 15 years, and for offenders convicted two or more times, the
duty to register lasts for the offender's lifetime. See id.
95 See id. § 18.65.087.
96 See Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1376. Registration also required the offenders to disclose infor-
mation regarding their conviction. See id.
97 See id. at 1375.	 •
98 See id. at 1378. See generally Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
99 See Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1378.
160 See id. The court did state, however, that registration did not have a historically punitive
effect. See id. But, because the Registration Act is premised upon the past knowingly wrongful
conduct of the registrant, the court found that this contributed to the law's punitive nature. See
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The district court then analyzed whether registration promoted
deterrence and retribution)°' The court determined that the legisla-
ture, by enacting the Registration Act, obviously meant to deter
crime." The court noted, however, that the only meaningful deter-
rence came from the modified conduct of the police and the public,
not the registrant." The court reasoned that the deterrence stemmed
from both forewarning the potential victims of a sex offender's pres-
ence enabling them to take evasive action and allowing the police to
act more swiftly." The court also stated that the public's strong reac-
tion and the humiliation that could flow from registration and notifica-
tion exacts retribution from the registrants." Therefore, the court
concluded that the Registration Act had a punitive effect."
In addition, the court determined that the Registration Act fur-
thered an entirely proper nonpunitive purpose—the protection of
society—and this factor thus detracted from the punitive effect of the
act.'" Finally, the court sought to determine whether the sanction
appeared excessive in relation to its legitimate nonpunitive effect."
Here, the court found the burdens associated with registration insig-
nificant." In contrast, the court stated that the consequences resulting
from public dissemination of the registrants' information were exces-
sive in relation to the Registration Act's legitimate purpose."° The
court thus 'granted a preliminary injunction against public dissemina-
tion of the plaintiffs' registration information, holding that the plain-
tiffs would likely succeed on the merits of their claim that the commu-
nity notification provisions of the Registration Act violated the
prohibition on ex post facto legislation)"
Similarly, in 1995, in Artway v. Attorney General, the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey held that two out of three
id. The court considered this factor lightly, to be consistent with the ruling in United States u
Huss, 7 F.3c1 1444, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1993). See id. at 1378-79. In Huss, an Oregon law prohibiting
felons from possessing a long gun was held not to be an ex post facto law. See 7 F.3d at 1447-48.
101 See Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379.
02 See id. .
to See id.
104 See id.
1 °5 See id.
1136 See Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379. The court also found that registration applied to behavior
that was already a crime, adding that, similar to the finding of scienter, this factor carried little
weight, because to find otherwise would contradict the decision in Huss. See id. at 1379; see also
United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1999).
1 °7 See Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379.
1 °° See id.
in See id.
i° See id.
ill See id. at 1380, 1388.
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provisions for notification in New Jersey's Sexual Offender Registration
Act ("Megan's Law"), when applied retroactively, violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.' 12 Megan's Law, enacted
on October 31, 1994, requires a person who completed a sentence for
certain designated offenses to register with local authorities if, at the
time of sentencing, he or she demonstrates repetitive and compulsive
behavior." The registrant is required to give his or her name, social
security number, address and date and place of employment along with
other similar information." 4
After registration, the registering agency would forward the infor-
mation, as well as any additional information it may have, such as
fingerprints and a description of the conviction, to the County Prose-
cutor."5 The public cannot inspect the registration information itself,
but the statute does authorize law enforcement agencies to release to
the public relevant and necessary information concerning registrants
when necessary for public protection." 6 Megan's Law assigns the reg-
istrant to one of three classifications—tier one, tier two or tier three—
based on the risk of recidivism that the individual posed.'" Each tier
requires different levels of notification."' For the moderate and high
risk offenders, notification includes a recent photograph, physical de-
scription of the registrant, description of the offense, and place of
employment or schooling, as well as a description and license plate
"2 876 F. Supp. 666, 692 (D.NJ. 1995), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir.
1996).
15 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2b(1) (West 1997). The person has to register with the chief
law enforcement officer of the municipality in which he or she resided within 120 days of the
effective date of the law or by February 28, 1995. See id. § 2C:7-4b(1).
114 See id. § 2C:7-4b(1). The individual also has to give his or her age, race, sex, date of birth,
height, weight, hair and eye color and address of legal residence. See id. The registrant also is
required to verify his or her address every 90 days, notify the municipal law enforcement agency
when he or she moves, and re-register with the law enforcement agency of any new municipality.
See id. § 2C:7-2d, -2e.
"5 See id. § 2C:7-4c, -4d. The prosecutor then forwards the information to the Division of
State Police for inclusion in a central registry. See id. The information is available for use by law
enforcement agencies of New Jersey, the United States and other states. See id, § 2C:7-5.
"See id. § 2C:7-5.
117 See id. § 2C:7-8.
118 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8c(1) to -8c(3). When the risk of re-offense is low (tier one),
Megan's Law mandates the notification of law enforcement agencies likely to encounter the
registrant. See id. § 207-8c (1). When the registrant poses a moderate risk (tier two), the law states
that the prosecutor, working with local law enforcement agencies, must notify the. surrounding
schools, licensed day care centers and summer camps, as well as other community organizations
involved in the care or supervision of children or battered women (including rape victims). See
id. § 2C:7-8c(2). When the registrant poses a serious threat and the risk is high (tier three), the
statute requires that law enforcement agenciei notify members of the public likely to encounter
the registrant. See id. § 2C:7-8c(5).
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number of the registrant's vehicle." 9 In Artway, the plaintiff filed a
motion for temporary and injunctive relief from enforcement of
Megan's Law."' The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of
Megan's Law on various grounds, including that Megan's Law consti-
tuted an ex post facto law."'
The court concluded that the public notification provisions of
Megan's Law, when taken in the context of the Mendoza-Martinez test,
constituted more of a form of punishment than a regulatory scheme.'"
Similar to the Rowe court, this court used the Mendoza -Martinez factors
to determine the law's penal effect.'" In doing so, the court considered
whether the notification provisions of Megan's Law constituted a
branding of registrants, thereby exposing them to public humiliation
rising to the level of punishment. 124
The court decided that public dissemination of the registrant's
information imposed an affirmative disability on the registrant.'" The
court found that dissemination may affect the registrant's employabil-
ity, his or her associations with neighbors and thus the registrant's
ability to return to a normal, private, law-abiding life within the com-
munity.' 26 The court also stated that throughout history, people per-
ceived public dissemination of the offender's information as punish-
ment. 127
Furthermore, the court implied that the law sought to facilitate
police in protecting the community, increase parents' vigilance in
protecting their children and discourage recidivism.' 28 The court thus
concluded that Megan's Law promoted deterrence, one of the basic
19 See Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 669. Persons and organizations notified under tier two arc
warned that sharing the information with the general public is a criminal offense. See id.
128 See id. at 667.
121 See id. at 668. The plaintiff also contended that Megan's Law deprived him of his right to
due process, equal protection and privacy, that it violated the constitutional prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment and that it constituted a bill of attainder. See id.
1 " See id at 692. See generally Mendoza Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
1 " See Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 673. See generally Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69; Rowe,
884 F. Stipp. at 1378.
124 See Artway, 876 F. Stipp. at 687.
125 See id. at 688-89.
128 See id. The court recognized that the public already had access to criminal records. See
id. Yet, the court emphasized that Megan's Law went beyond access to criminal records by
disseminating information personal to the registrant not contained in the criminal record. See
id.
127 See id. at 689. The court found public dissemination of information punitive in view of
the loathsome public perception traditionally associated with sex offenses. See id. The court next
found that Megan's Law affected only those convicted of sex offenses—which itself required a
finding of scienter. See id.
128 See id. at 690. The court stated that Megan's Law functioned to deter recidivism through
heightened police and public awareness. See id.
December 1997] 	 COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS	 213
goals of punishment, thereby contributing to its punitive nature.' 29 The
court also noted that Megan's Law applied only to actions already
defined as a crime.'" The court did find, however, a rational, alterna-
tive purpose assignable to Megan's Law.'" Nevertheless, the court
stated that, despite the presence of a legitimate alternative purpose for
Megan's Law, public dissemination caused the law to have a punitive
effect.' 32 Finally, the court found that Megan's Law exceeded the regu-
latory purpose assigned to 4.' 33
The court thus found that most, if not all, of the Mendoza-Martinez
factors weighed in favor of findirT that Megan's Law had a punitive
effect.I 34 It also found that all of the factors outweighed the New Jersey
Legislature's regulatory intent.'" The court held accordingly that the
notification provisions in tier two and tier three violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the Constitution.' 36
Both parties appealed the district court's decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Artway v. Attorney
General ("Artway II"). 137 In 1996, in Artway II, the court upheld the
constitutionality of the registration provision but refused to rule on the
constitutionality of the notification provisions because the claim was
not ripe.'" Although Megan's Law required the appellant, Artway, to
register, it did not necessarily follow that he would be classified as a
tier two or tier three offender, such as to allow public notification.'"
The court thus refused to adjudicate such an "abstract" issue.mAccord-
ingly, the Third Circuit vacated that part of the district court's opin-
ion."' The court implied, however, that while it was not certain whether
Megan's Law required the appellant to be classified in either tiers two
or three, thus allowing for public notification, the registrant would be
registered in tier one at the very least.' 42
129 See Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 691,
139 See id.
131 See id. The New jersey Legislature intended to protect the public by increasing community
awareness of the risk involved in having a registered offender as a neighbor. See id.
132
 See id. at 692.
133 See id. According to the court, Megan's Law represented an excessive intrusion into the
realm of punishment. See id.
134 See Arlway, 876 F. Supp. at 692. See generally Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S, at 168-69.
la5 See Arlway, 876 F. Supp. at 692.
150 See ed.
1 " 81 F.Sd 1235, 1245 (3d Cir. 1996).
199 See id. at 1251. The court implied that because appellant Artway must register under
Megan's Law, the appeal on the constitutionality of the registration provisions was ripe. See id. at
1250.
139 See id. at 1251.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 1252-53.
142 See Artway II, 81 F.3d al 1250.
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The Third Circuit stated that the United States Supreme Court
clearly stated that the Mendoza-Martinez test did not control the issues
in this case.' 43 The court concluded that the Mendoza Martinez test did
not apply outside the context of determining whether a proceeding
was sufficiently criminal in nature to warrant the criminal protections
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution.'The court
did, however, establish a test to be applied to the registration provisions
and tier one offenders.' 45 For this test, the court formulated three
questions: (1) what was the actual purpose of the measure, (2) what
was its objective purpose, and (3) what were the effects of the meas-
ure?'" The court focused on the objective purpose prong which had
three subparts—first, whether a solely remedial purpose could justify
the law; second, whether the history of registration resembled punish-
ment; and third, if the law's history showed a regulatory purpose,
incidental deterrence of future offenses did not invalidate the law as
unconstitutional.' 47 The. Third Circuit applied this test to Megan's
Law's registration provisions and found that they did not violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.'"
Similar to the Third Circuit in Artway II, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey also rejected the Mendoza-Martinez test, stating that it ap-
plied only when determining the underlying nature of the proceed-
ing—whether it was civil or criminal.'" In 1996, in Doe v. Poritz, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held, in relevant part, that the purpose
and implementation of Megan's Law, retroactively applied, was solely
remedial and did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitu-
tion. 15° In Doe v. Poritz, the plaintiff, a first-time sex offender, brought
an action challenging the constitutionality of Megan's Law. 151 The
plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of the statute.' 52 The plain-
143 See id. at 1262; see also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,610 n.6 (1993). See generally
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69. In Austin, the Supreme Court stated that the issue in
Mendoza-Martinez was whether a civil penalty should be reclassified as criminal and thus receive
the attendant safeguards of a criminal prosecution. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 n.6. The Court
further reasoned that in addressing the question of whether punishment was being imposed, the
Court had not employed the Mendoza-Martinez test. See id. See generally Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. at 168-69.
144 See Artway II, 81 F.3d at 1262; see also Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 n.6. See generally Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
143
 See Artway II, 81 F.3d at 1263.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 1264-66.
148
 See id. at 1271.
149 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367,402 (NJ. 1995). See generally Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
at 168-69; Artway IL 81 F.3d at 1262.
15°662 A.2d at 405.
131 Id. at 380.
152 See id.
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tiff successfully completed treatment at the Adult Diagnostic and Treat-
ment Center.'" He also completed parole and lived and worked in the
community at the time of the enactment of Megan's Law.'"
In ruling on the statute's constitutionality, the court considered
the legislature's intent in enacting the statute, as well as the statute's
impact on the registrants.' 55 The court determined that whether a
measure constituted punishment depended on the purposes actually
served by the law, not the underlying nature of the law.' 55 Concluding
that Megan's Law had a remedial ,purpose, the court stated that it did
not constitute punishment even though it had some incidental deter-
rent impact.' 57 The court reasoned that punitive impact facilitated
retribution or accomplished deterrence.'" The court found the regis-
tration and notification provisions of Megan's Law unlikely to deter
repetitive, compulsive offenders who, faced with the threat of long-
term incarceration, were not previously deterred from committing
offenses. 159 Furthermore, assuming that removing the offender's ano-
nymity aided in deterrence, the court stated that this was the inevitable
consequence of Megan's Law's remedial provisions.' 60 The court found
that Megan's Law did not become punitive simply because it had a
punitive impact, unless the only explanation for that impact was an
intent to punish.'" Thus, the court held that the registration and
notification provisions of Megan's Law did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution.' 62
In contrast, in 1996, in Doe v. Pataki, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York issued a preliminary
injunction against retroactive application of the public notification
provisions of the New York State Sex Offender Registration Act ("Act"),
holding that the provisions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution.'" In Pataki, the plaintiffs, prior sex offenders, brought
an action challenging the constitutionality of the Act.'" The plaintiffs
155 See id.
151 See id.
155 See Doe v. Moritz, 662 A.2d at 388.
156 See id. at 402.
157 See id. at 388. The court stated that it must perform the most searching inquiry before
condemning honest laws that were free of punitive intent and designed to protect society. See id.
at 389. The real issue, as stated by the court, was whether Megan's Law inflicted punishment. See
id. at 390.
158 See id. at 390.
159 See id. at 404.
r'4) See Doe v. Moritz, 662 A.2d at 404.
Ial See id. at 388.
In See id. at 405.
161 919 F. Supp. 691, 701, 702 (S,D.N.Y. 1996).
/64 See id. at 693.
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moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining retroactive application
of the Act's registration and notification provisions.' 66
The Act requires individuals convicted of certain sex offenses to
register with law enforcement officials, and it authorizes those officials,
in certain situations, to disseminate information regarding the regis-
trants to the public.' 66 Sex offenders must register with the Division of
Criminal Justice Services within ten days after discharge, parole or
release. 167
 The statute requires that sex offenders on parole or proba-
tion as of the effective date of the Act must register, even though the
conduct that led to the conviction occurred prior to the passage of the
Act. 168 To register, the individuals provide certain identifying informa-
tion. 169 Similar to New Jersey's Megan's Law, this Act also provides for
three levels of notification.'" Increased notification is provided to law
enforcement agencies and/or the public as the risk of recidivism and
the danger to the public increases."' The Act provides identifying
information regarding all registrants, whether level one, two or three,
166 See id.
166 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1684(1) (McKinney 1997). The Act allows authorities to notify the
public of the identity and whereabouts of registrants. See id. § 168-1(6)(6), -46)(c). The Act
creates two categories of offenses that require registration, sex offenses and sexually violent
offenses. See id. § 168-a(2), (3). Sex offenses include rape in the second or third degree, sodomy
in the second or third degree, sexual abuse in the second or third degree and convictions for
attempt thereof. See id. § 168-a(2). Sexually violent offenses include convictions for rape in the
first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree and convictions for
attempt thereof. See id § 168-a(3). The Act defines a sex offender as any person convicted of a
sex offense or a sexually violent offense. See id. § 168-a(1).
167 See id. § 168-f(1).
168 See id. § 168-g(2). Sex offenders have to register annually for 10 years as well as within 10
calendar days prior to any change of address. See id. § 1684(2) to 4(4), 168-h. A sexually violent
predator, defined as an individual convicted of a sexually violent offense or a sex offender who
suffers from a mental abnormality that makes it more likely that the individual will engage in
predatory sexual conduct, must register annually and, in addition, personally verify his or her
registration at the local law enforcement agency every 90 days for at least 10 years. See id.
§ 168-a(7), 1684(3), 168-h, 168-1(6)(c).
169 See id. § 168-b. The information required includes name, date of birth, height, weight,
sex, eye color, driver's license number and home address. See id. Also required is a description
of the offense, the date of conviction, and the sentence imposed, as well as a photograph and
fingerprints. See id. § 168-b, 168-i.
170 See id. § 168-1(6). See generally N.J. STAT. Arm § 2C:7-8c(1) to -8c(S) (West 1997).
171 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 168-1(6). If the offender poses a low risk of recidivism, the state
assigns him or her to level one, and only law enforcement agencies receive notification. See id.
§ 166-1(6)(a). If the offender represents a moderate risk, the state classifies him or her as a
level-two risk, which provides for the dissemination of an approximate address of the registrant,
a photograph and background information to any entity with vulnerable populations. See id.
§ 168-/(6)(b). The Act states that any entity receiving this information can further disclose it at
its discretion. See id. If the offender poses a serious threat to public safety, the state classifies him
or her as a level-three risk. See id. § 168-/(6)(c). Level three provided for the same notification
as level-two offenders, but also authorizes the law enforcement agencies to disclose the exact
address of the registrant, not just an approximate address. See id.
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to the public through a "900" telephone number.'" The unauthorized
release of any information constitutes a crime.'"
The State convicted all three plaintiffs, John Doe, Richard Roc
and Samuel Poe, of sexually violent offenses prior to the passage of the
Act. 174 The state notified John Doe and Richard Roe in February, 1996,
that the Act classified them as level three risks and therefore they had
to register with the proper authorities.'" Plaintiff Samuel Poe, still in-
carcerated at the time of this trial but slated for immediate release from
prison, was required to appear before the state court for classifica-
tion.'" Defendants represented various New York government
officials.'"
In determining whether the Act violated the Ex Post Facto Clause,
the district court first looked at the Act's legislative intent.'" The court
noted that if the legislature intended that the Act serve a purely
punitive purpose, then the Act clearly violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause.'" If the legislature intended the Act to serve a regulatory
purpose, the court stated that it must further determine whether the
statute had a punitive effect.'" Because the New York legislature la-
beled the Act as regulatory, the court reviewed the Act's practical
function and effect. 18 '
The court analyzed five factors of the Mendoza-Martinez test to
determine whether the Act had a punitive effect.' 82 First, the court
found that public notification of one's crime traditionally has been
viewed as punitive.'" Next, the court concluded that the Act served
one of the traditional functions of punishment, namely deterrence,
and thus lent to a finding of punitive effect. 184 The court reasoned that
the public notification provisions imposed a significant unpleasant
1" See id. § 168-p. To access information regarding a particular registrant, the Act requires
the caller to provide information that reasonably identifies the person in question as a registrant.
See id. The telephone calls are recorded and the callers arc required to identify themselves. See
id.
1 " See id. § 168-u.
174 See Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 696. John Doe was convicted of attempted rape in the first
degree in 1990; Richard Roc was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree in 1995; and Samuel
Poe was convicted of attempted sodomy in the first degree in 1989. See id.
175 See id. at 696.
176 See id.
1 " See id.
171 ' See id. at 699.
179 See Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 700.
180 See id.
181 See id.
162 See id. at 701. See generally Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
185 See Fatah 919 F. Supp. at 701.
184 See id.
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consequence upon the plaintiffs and thereby deterred future criminal
conduct.' 85 The court reasoned that public notification attached a
stigma to the registrants that would interfere with their personal and
professional lives.'" Furthermore, the court decided that the public
notification provisions of the Act imposed an affirmative disability or
restraint on the registrants.'"
Next, the court determined that the Act applied only to behavior
that already constituted a crime.'" The court found that this factor also
weighed in favor of a finding of punitive effect.'" Finally, even though
the New York legislature stated a legitimate regulatory purpose for the
Act, because the Act's public notification provisions led to excessively
harsh results, the court considered these provisions punitive.'" After
analyzing the totality of the circumstances, the court found that the
public notification provisions, including the "900" telephone number,
constituted punitive measures. 191 Therefore, the court held that retro-
active application of the provisions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause
and thus issued a preliminary injunction.'"
Later that same year, in September 1996, the parties in Doe v.
Pataki brought cross-motions for summary judgment on the constitu-
tionality of the Act in Doe v. Pataki ("Pataki Il").' 93 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs on their claim that retroactive application of the notifica-
tion provisions of the Act violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.' 84 The
court, however, ruled in favor of the defendants on their claim that
the retroactive application of the registration provisions of the Act did
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause."The court reasoned that it had
to look at the totality of the circumstances, keeping in mind the
definition and purposes of punishment and the Ex Post Facto Clause.'"
The court stated that regardless of what factors it used, there were no
"rigid hurdles" that had to be overcome.'" The court further stated
185 See id.
188 See Id.
187
 See id.
188 See Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 701.
In See id.
IR° See id.
191 See id. at 702.
192 See id.
193 940 F. Supp. 603, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
194 Ste id. at 631.
195 Set id.
198 See id.
197 See id. at 620.
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that the issue of which legislative actions would be sufficiently harsh to
constitute punishment was a matter of degree.'"
The court analyzed the circumstances—including some of the
factors considered in the Mendoza-Martinez test—by grouping them
into four areas: (1) intent, (2) design, (3) history and (4) effects.'"
The court required the clearest proof before it could find that the
Act—intended to provide a civil remedy—became punitive by its "form
and effect."'" The court reasoned that intent must be viewed both
subjectively—the stated intent of. the legislature—and objectively—
whether punitive goals were implicated or whether the Act had mixed
motives. 201 The court determined that the subjective intent, as stated
in the preamble to the Act, was regulatory."'
The court noted that the design of the Act also contained classic
indicia of a punitive scheme.'" For example, provisions of the Act
applied to behavior already defined as a crime."' The court stated that
many of the risk factors used to determine the level of notification
came from the registrant's criminal history.'" Furthermore, the court
reasoned that punishment historically has been characterized by stig-
matization and banishment.'" The court found that public notification
represented the modern-day equivalent of branding and shaming.'"
The court stated that the notification provisions resulted in banish-
tnent of the offenders from their communities, both literally and
psychologically.'" Thus, the court found that public notification made
it difficult for some registrants to reintegrate into society.'"
The court emphasized that the effects of the Act clearly demon-
strated the punitive nature of the notification provisions of the Act."'°
The court stated that the Act imposed an "affirmative disability or
restraint" on registrants because it forced some of them to relocate.'"
122 See Pataki II, 940 F. Supp. at 620.
199 See id. See generally Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
2" See Pataki II, 940 F. Supp. at 620-21.
401 See id. at 621.
202 See id. The court did note, however, that in this case, the comments of legislators during
the debate revealed their loathe toward sex offenders and thus strongly indicated that the
legislators intended to punish sex offenders. See id. at 621, 622.
202 See id. at 623.
224 See id.
222 See Pataiti II, 940 F. Supp. al 623.
206 See id. at 624.
227 See id. at 625. Instead of using a physical brand, the court reasoned that the Act allowed
the use of "900" numbers and photocopying. See id.
228 See id.
2°9 See id.
210 See Pataki II, 940 F. Supp. at 626.
211 See id. at 627, 628.
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The court held that the Act also led to excessively harsh results. 212 The
court determined that the public notification provisions of the Act
impeded the rehabilitation of the registrants and thus increased pun-
ishment. 2" The court reasoned that the notification provisions of the
Act prevented some registrants from finding a home, getting a job and
reintegrating into society. 214 Finally, the court concluded that the Act
promoted traditional aims of punishment—deterrence and retribu-
tion. 215 The court found that the ostracism and humiliation cast upon
the registrants sufficed as a deterrent for future offenses. 216 It also
stated that, by imposing the notification provisions on registrants, the
Act served as retribution for the offenders' past harm. 217 After viewing
the totality of the circumstances, the district court held that the public
notification provisions of the Act, as applied retroactively, violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.212
C. United States v. Ursery: Punishment Defined
The United States Supreme Court recently defined punishment
for constitutional purposes in 1996, in United States v. Ursery, holding
that in rem civil forfeitures did not constitute punishment for the
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution. 219 The Court established a two-part test for determin-
ing whether a statute constituted punishment. 22° First, the Court looked
to Congress's intent in enacting the statute. 22' Second, the Court con-
sidered whether the statute was so punitive in effect that it could not
be viewed as civil in nature, despite Congress's intent. 222 The Court
focused on whether the proceedings called for in the statute had been
traditionally viewed as civil proceedings, whether they covered non-
criminal conduct and whether they satisfied remedial aims—deterring
212 See id. at 627.
415 See id. at 628.
214 See id.
215 See Paiaki II, 940 F. Su pp. at 629.
216 See id.
20 See id.
215 See id. at 631.
219 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2149 (1996); see U.S. CoNs .r. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution states in relevant part that "(n)o person . shall be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . ..." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Court also held that
the in rem civil forfeiture was not criminal for purposes of the Double jeopardy Clause, See Ursery,
116 S. Ct. at 2149.
520 See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.
221 See id. at 2142.
222 See id. at 2147.
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certain activity and protecting society. 223 Furthermore, the Court stated
that deterrence did not necessitate a finding of punishment. 224 The
Court also considered the historical nature of the statute—whether it
had been traditionally regarded as punishment. 226 Finally, the Court
considered whether there was the "clearest proof" that the statute was
so punitive in form and effect that it negated the legislature's intent
to establish a remedial measure. 226 In Ursery, the Court rejected the
contention that because the statute attached itself to criminal behavior,
it rendered the statute punitive."' The Supreme Court held that in rem
civil forfeitures did not constitute punishment for the purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. 228
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
relied on Ursery in 1996, in W.P. v. Poritz, and held that the notification
provisions of the New Jersey Registration and Community Notification
Laws ("Megan's Law"), as retroactively applied, did not violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. 229 In WP, the parties brought
cross-motions for summary judgment on this issue. 2" Relying on Art-
way, the court had previously issued a preliminary injunction against
the enforcement of the community notification provisions of Megan's
Law."' The injunction terminated ten days after the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit handed down its decision in
Artway /1. 232
The district court stated that it had planned to use the formula
set out in Artway II when the United States Supreme Court handed
223 See id. at 2142.
221 See id. at 2149.
225 See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149.
226 See id. at 2142.
227 See id. at 2149.
225 see id.
229 931 F. Stipp. 1199, 1203, 1204, 1209, 1224 (D.N.j. 1996). See generally Ursery, 116 S. Cu at
2147.
259 See 931 F. Supp. at 1203.
291 See id. at 1205. See, generally Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 673 (D.N.j. 1995),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
"2 See WE, 931 F. Supp. at 1205. See generally Artway II, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996). The
Third Circuit, in Artway II, did not rule on the constitutionality of the claims attacking tier two
and tier three notification provisions because they lacked ripeness. See 81 F.3d at 1251; see also
supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text. Although the Third Circuit found that the tier two
and tier three challenges were not ripe, the court structured a rigid analysis applicable to
registration and tier one offenders. See Artway 7I, 81 F.3d at 1263; see also supra notes 142-47 and
accompanying text, Because this test was used to determine whether a law constituted punish-
ment, the WE court reasoned that it also applied to determine whether the community notifica-
tion provisions of tier two and tier three offenders constituted punishment. See 931 F. Supp. at
1207.
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down its opinion in Ursery, altering the analysis. 253 The W.P. court
found that the decision in Artway II did not survive Ursery and con-
cluded that it had to follow Ursery. 234 Under Ursery, the court reasoned
that the considerations for analysis consisted of the expressed intent
of the legislature as reflected in the legislation itself and the legislative
history, the objective purpose of that legislation, the balancing of
remedial and punitive goals, the historical treatment of such laws and
the effect of such laws. 235
 The court found the expressed legislative
intent, as well as its objective nature, remedial." The court stated that
even though the law may deter the regiitrant from recidivism in his
community, Ursery stated that deterrence did not equal punishment. 237
The court thus reasoned that incidental deterrence did not undercut
the regulatory nature of Megan's Law."S 8 Nor did the court find that
the legislature sought to impose retribution through Megan's Law. 239
The court stated that Megan's Law was not an "instrument of venge-
ance," but rather the statute sought to affect the future conduct of
those deemed threats to society. 240
The court also found that Megan's Law significantly differed from
the shaming behavior historically associated with punishment."' The
court expressed that a government always had the right to warn the
community about the presence of dangerous persons. 242 The court
stated that it had never understood such warnings as imposing uncon-
stitutional punishment."' The court determined that the purpose and
effects of the public notification provisions did not rise to the degree
necessary for the court to consider Megan's Law punishment. 244 There-
fore, the court held that the public notification provisions of Megan's
Law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. 245
In 1996, the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts handed down one of the more recent decisions regarding sex
offender registration in Doe v. Weld.216 The court held that the plaintiff,
299
	
WP, 931 1 Supp. at 1207. See generally Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.
234 See WP, 931 F. Supp. at 1209. See generally Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.
205 See WP, 931 F. Supp, at 1209. See generally Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147,
230 See WP, 931 F. Supp. at 1213, 1214.
297
	
id. at 1214; see also Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149.
238 See WP, 931 F. Supp. at 1214.
239 See id.
24° See id.
24t
	 id. at 1217.
242 See id.
243 See W.P, 931 F. Supp. at 1217.
2" See id. at 1219.
243 See id. at 1203, 1204, 1209, 1224.
243 954 F. Supp. 425, 426 (D. Mass. 1996). The plaintiff pled guilty to four counts of indecent
assault and battery on a child. See id, at 429.
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a convicted juvenile sex offender, was unlikely to prevail on his claim
that the retroactively applied registration statute violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the Constitution. 247 Thus, the court refused to grant a
preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff. 2"
The Massachusetts statute at issue in Weld resembled those at issue
in similar cases. 249 It established a central registry of information re-
garding the state's sex offenders, including juveniles, and a three-
tiered system similar to that of New Jersey's Megan's Law.25° The Mas-
sachusetts statute allowed for public disclosure even for tier one
offenders—those with the lowest risk of re-offending. 251 The registry
allowed public disclosure for a tier one offender, however, only if a
person inquired whether an identified person was an offender. 252
The court defined the threshold issue as whether the statute
punished the registrants. 255 Because the plaintiff had no prior criminal
record and had served only four months probation, the court deter-
mined that he probably would be classified as a tier one registrant, and
thus the court did not rule on the constitutionality of the Massachusetts
statute regarding tiers two or three. 254 The court stated that although
no strict formula existed to define punishment, Ursery provided the
best analytical framework to determine whether the nature of the
statute constituted punishment.255
In so finding, the court first determined that the legislative record
revealed that the legislature had a purely regulatory intent in enacting
the statute. 256 Next, the court found that the state carefully circum-
scribed public access to the data involving a level one offender, thus
contributing to its nonpunitive nature. 257 The court reasoned that the
statute took the most restrictive approach to the distribution of registry
R 41 See id. at 436.
245 See id. at 436, 458.
249 See id. at 427; see also Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Rowe v. Burton, 884
F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
25° See generally MASS. CaN. LAWS ANN. ch . 6, §§ 178C-1780 (1997). The Massachusetts
statute provides for a central registry of information regarding the state's sex offenders and a
three-tiered system whereby the registration information, such as offender's name, home and
work addresses, personal characteristics and photograph, may be distributed to the public. See
id. § 178D, 178K(2). The statute provides for three levels of notification depending on the degree
of the risk of re-offense. See id. § 178K(2). An offender with a low risk of re-offense, as determined
by the Sex Offender Registry Board, is classified as level one, moderate risks are classified as level
two and high risks arc classified as level three. See id.
251 See id. § 178K(2) (a).
252 See id. § 1781.
255 See Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 431.
254 See id. at 433.
255 See id. at 432. See generally Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.
256 See Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 453.
257 See id. at 435.
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data Y58 The court determined that the statute allowed level one no-
tification only when concerned community members personally
sought information to protect themselves and their children. 259 Al-
though the state traditionally kept juvenile criminal records confiden-
tial, unlike those of their adult counterparts, the court concluded that
the newfound public disclosure provision of the statute did not consti-
tute punishment even when applied to juvenile offenders. 26° Further-
more, the court found the level one notification scheme rationally
connected to the statutory purpose of permitting a vulnerable commu-
nity to protect itself. 261 Thus, the court held that the statute did not
constitute punishment. 262 Therefore, the district court found the plain-
tiff unlikely to prevail on his claim that the registration and community
notification provisions, retroactively applied, violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution."' Consequently, the court did not grant a
preliminary injunction. 26't
III. VARIED TESTS LEAD TO INCONSISTENT RESULTS
The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitu-
tionality of the various state sex offender registration statutes ("stat-
utes"). This has led to conflicting decisions among various state and
federal courts. 265 No universal test or framework has been developed
to guide courts in deciding whether the statutes, as applied retroac-
tively, violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.266 Although courts are applying different tests, all the tests have
258 See id.
262
 See id.
266 See id. at 435-36.
261 See Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 436.
262
 See id.
263 See id.
264 See id. at 438.
265 Compare, e.g., W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199 (D.NJ. 1996), and Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d
367 (N.J. 1995), and State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994), With Doe v. Pataki ("Pataki IF),
940 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), and Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994).
266 Compare, e.g., WP, 931 F. Supp. 1199, and Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, and Ward, 869
P.2d 1062, with Pataki II, 940 F. Supp. 603, and Rowe, 884 F. Supp. 1372. Thus, pre-Ursery cases
relied heavily on the Kennedy v. Mendoza -Martinez test. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691,
700 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1378; Ward, 869 P.2d at 1068. See generally Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). The courts considered most, if not all, of the
seven factors set out in the test. See Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 700; Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1378; Ward,
869 P.2d at 1068. Nevertheless, according to the Third Circuit in Artway II, and the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Doe u. Poritz, the Mendoza -Martinez test is inapplicable outside the context of
deciding whether a particular measure is sufficiently criminal in nature to invoke the protections
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See Artway II, 81 F.3d 1235, 1262 (3d Cir. 1996); Doe v. Poritz,
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some overlapping characteristics. 267 Each involves determining the ef-
fects of the statute, some to a greater extent than others. 268 In most
cases the effects of the statutes were of paramount importance, if not
dispositive, in deciding whether the statute constituted punishment. 269
In every case where a court found that the effects constituted punish-
ment, it held that the statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 270 Thus,
the effects of the statute appear to be the deciding issue.
Of the cases discussed, only one, State v. Ward, relied on the test
set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez and found that the statute did
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause."' Although, in Artway II, the
662 A.2d at 402. See generally Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69. In spite of this, lower courts
continue to apply the Mendoza-Martina test. See, e.g., Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1378. In 1996, the
United States Supreme Court defined punishment for constitutional purposes in United States v
Ursery. 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2147 (1996). In Ursery, the Court focused on the legislative intent and
actual effects of the statute. See id. Some subsequent cases relied on the test set forth in Ursery
when deciding whether the statutes constituted punishment. See, e.g., Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 452;
WE, 931 F. Supp. at 1209. See generally Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147. Until the United States Supreme
Court specifically rules on the constitutionality of the registration statutes, however, lower courts
will continue to apply different tests; in doing so, the courts' decisions will fall on different sides
of the issue, Compare, e.g., WE., 931 F. Supp. 1199, and Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, and Ward,
869 P.2d 1062, with Pataki 11, 940 F. Supp. 603, and Rowe, 884 F. Supp. 1372.
267 See generally Artway 11, 81 F.3d at 1263 (court looked at legislative intent and effects); Wff,
931 F. Supp. at 1209 (court considered legislative intent and effects). The Mendoza-Martinez test
employs seven factors: whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; whether
it has historically been regarded as punishment; whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter; whether its operation will promote the traditional aims or punishment, namely retribu-
tion and deterrence; whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and, whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. See Mendoza-Martina, 372 U.S.
at 168-69. Of all of the sex offender registration cases discussed, four used the Mendoza-Martinez
test. See Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 700; Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 673 (D.Nj. 1995),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (8d Cir. 1996); Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1378; Ward, 869
P.2d at 1068. See generally Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69. Two cases, WE and Weld, applied
the Ursery test, at least in part. See Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 432; WP., 931 F. Supp. at 1209. See generally
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147. The remaining three cases, Artway II, Pataki II and Doe v. Poritz, used
tests similar to Ursery. See Artway II, 81 F.3d at 1265; Pataki II, 940 F. Supp. at 620; Doe v. Poritz,
662 A.2d at 888. See generally Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 1235. The Third Circuit, in Artway II, used a
three-prong test: whether the legislature actually intended to inflict punishment; whether it
objectively inflicted punishment; and, whether the effects were punitive in nature. See 81 F.3d at
1263. In Pataki II, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
considered four areas subject to discussion in similar cases-intent, design, history and effect. See
940 F. Supp. at 620. In Doe v. Poritz, the New jersey Supreme Court studied the intent and effects
of the statute. 662 A.2d at 388.
268 See, e.g., Artway II, 81 F.3d at 1263; Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 434-35; Pataki II, 940 F. Supp,
at 620; WE, 931 F. Supp. at 1209; Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 700; Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 673; Rowe,
884 F. Supp. at 1378; Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 388; Ward, 869 P.2d at 1068.
269 See cases cited supra note 268.
27° See Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 701, 702; Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1378, 1380.
"I See Ward, 869 P.2d at 1074. See generally Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
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Third Circuit found that the United States Supreme Court never
meant for the Mendoza-Martinez test to apply when determining
whether a statute constituted punishment. 272 Nevertheless, several
lower courts, both state and federal, continued to apply it when ana-
lyzing the effects of the statutes.'"
Even so, in applying the Mendoza-Martinez test to the sex offender
registration statutes, it is difficult to understand the courts' logic in
finding that the statutes constituted punishment. The Ward court was
correct in finding that the potential for public disclosure did not create
an affirmative disability or restraint on the registrants. 274 State criminal
justice agencies already authorized the public release of criminal re-
cords. 275 Therefore, the disclosure of additional information regarding
the offender did not impose an additional burden. 276 Only when the
disclosure contained personal data not associated with the conviction
was there a possibility of additional restraint. 277 Any incidental restraint,
however, was minimal because of the legislatures' limited public disclo-
sure of registrant information. 278
In addition to determining whether the statutes imposed an affir-.
mative disability or restraint on the offenders, the courts gave great
weight to whether the statutes served the traditional aims of punish-
ment—deterrence and retribution. 279 Sexual predators are compulsive
by nature. 28° It is hard to believe that sexual predators fail to realize
the consequences of their actions. 28 ' When caught, they face a sig-
nificant period of incarceration, probation and public humiliation. 282
The local media usually broadcast the arrest and conviction, their
court hearing is open to the public and after conviction, their criminal
records are available to the public. 2" Yet, people are still committing
sex offenses.284 If the threat of a lengthy prison sentence (and/or
272
 See Artway II, 81 F,3d at 1262. See generally Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
275 See Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 700; Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 673; Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1378;
Ward, 869 P.2d at 1068.
274 See Ward, 869 P.2d at 1069.
275 See id.
276 Set id.
277
 See id.
278 See id. at 1074.
272 See, e.g., Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379; Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
288 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 404 (N.J. 1995).
281 See Claire M. Kimball, Note & Comment, A Modern Day Arthur Dimmesdale: Public No-
tification When Sex Offenders are Released into the Community, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1187, 1200
(1996).
282 See generally Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 404; Kimball, supra note 281.
283 See generally Ward, 869 P.2d at 1069.
284 See, e.g., Artway II, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. 425 (D. Mass.
1996); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367.
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probation) and the public humiliation and ostracism associated with
the offense did not deter the offenders, it can hardly be said that the
potential for future public disclosure would act as a deterrent. 285 Under
certain state laws, not all sex offenders are.classified such as to warrant
community notification.288 Furthermore, community notification, if ap-
plicable, does not occur until the offender is released back into soci-
ety.287 This could be years from the date of offense. The offender who
faces immediate incarceration and still is not deterred will probably
not be deterred by the possibility of an arguably additional burden in
the distant future. 288
Courts that concluded that the statutes were a deterrent reasoned
that deterrence stems from the forewarning given to the public and
the police, which enables the public to take evasive action and the
police to act more swiftly.289 The courts' reasoning appears to be flawed.
The courts' goal was to determine whether the statutes' effects are
punishment as enforced against the offenders. 290 Yet, behavior wholly apart
from and quite possibly unbeknownst to the offenders is used as a measuring
stick to determine the statutes' punitive effects on the offenders. 291 The
courts seem to imply that by protecting innocent victims and moving
them out of harm's way (the offenders' vicinity), the statutes are
punishing the offenders.292 This logic yields the conclusion that be-
cause the offenders may have a reduced lot of victims to choose from,
they are being punished.'" Black's Law Dictionary defines "deter" as
"No discourage or stop by fear . . . o stop or prevent from acting
by danger, difficulty, or other consideration which disheartens or coun-
tervails the motive for the act."294 The public's evasive actions, although
making it harder for the offender to re-offend, are not discouraging
the offender through fear of reprisal, but rather, they present the
offender with less chance to re-offend. 295 Nor is the public "disheart-
ening" or "countervailing" the offender's motive by making themselves
less vulnerable to the offender. The motive of the sex offender is in
sea See generally Kimball, supra note 281.
"6 See Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691, 695-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876
F. Supp. 666, 668-69 (D.N.J. 1995), affd in part, vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996);
Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1376 (D. Alaska 1994).
2" See Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 695-96; Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 668-69; Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at
1376.
289 See generally Kimball, supra note 281.
4e9
	
Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 690; Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379.
2" See Weld, 954 F. Supp. al 434-35; Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp, 603, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
291 See generally Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 690; Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379.
292 See generally Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 690; Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379.
295 generally Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 690; Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379.
284 BLACK'S Dm DICTIONARY 450 (6th ed, 1990).
295 See generally Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 690; Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379.
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his or her psyche. While evasive action may countervail the would-be
re-offender's attempt or plan, it does not countervail the offender's
motive. The motive, or impetus, driving the offender to re-offend is
not softened because of the public's actions. A reasonable reading of
this definition leads to the conclusion that a statute is a deterrent only
when conduct is stifled by the offender's fear of reprisal, not by the
community's evasive action, of which the offender may be unaware.
Especially in the context of punishment, deterrence should connote
an affirmative discouragement of the offender's conduct, not
a modification of the public's or the police's conduct that would ren-
der the offender less likely to re-offend.'" Otherwise, action solely by
others, entirely separate from and independent of the offender, could
contribute to the punitive effect that the statute has on the offender."'
Not only do the statutes fail to act as a deterrent, they also fail to
serve as retribution for the offenders' past criminal conduct."' The
legislatures' primary intent was to aid law enforcement agencies' - ef-
forts to protect their communities and the public's efforts to protect
themselves."' While the statutes may result in some retributive effects,
these effects are purely incidental to the main focus of the statutes."'
The incidental retributive effects do not override the statutes' regula-
tory and protective purposes."'
The last two factors of the Mendoza Martinez test provided the
greatest support for finding that the statute had a nonpunitive effect—
whether there was an alternative purpose rationally connected to the
statute and whether the statute was excessive in relation to that alter-
native purpose."' The courts unanimously concluded that the legisla-
tures enacted the statutes primarily, if not solely, for the purpose of
protecting the public."' Yet, a vast majority of those same courts found
that the statutes imposed burdens on registrants that were excessive in
relation to their nonpunitive, regulatory purpose."' The burdens im-
296 See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 294; Edward Miller, Executing Minors
and the Mentally Retarded: The Retribution and Deterrence Rationales, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 15, 47-48
(1990).
297 See generally Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 690; Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379.
29.9 See W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1214 (D.NJ. 1996).
23° See Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379 (nonpunitive purpose); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1073
(Wash. 1994) (same).
22° See WE, 931 F. Supp. at 1219; Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
3°1 See WE, 931 F. Supp. at 1219; Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
502 See Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073; see also WE, 931 F. Supp. at 1219; Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367,
388 (N.J. 1995). See generally Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
3°3 See Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379; Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
3°4 See Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379.
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posed on offenders, such as being subject to pre-arrest suspicion, were
merely incidental to registration.'m Although courts voiced their con-
cerns regarding public ostracism and threats of physical violence to-
ward registrants, these incidents were rare. 306 While community vigi-
lance is a concern, the statutes include measures designed to protect
against that very harm.' 97 The statutes generally provide for punish-
ment of the unauthorized release of registrant information received
by any member of the public." The courts, even those that found that
the statutes constituted punishment, gave little weight to the fact that
these statutes apply to past criminal conduct or that they apply upon
a finding of scienter."9 Therefore, even under the Mendoza Martinez
test, the statutes were not punitive in nature, and thus, retroactively
applied, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution,"°
In examining other tests used by the courts, intent, as well as form
and effect, were the primary factors considered. 3' The legislative in-
tent was viewed as regulatory and thus detracted from the statutes'
punitive nature."' As discussed above, the effects, such as possible
incidental deterrence and stigmatization that could accompany regis-
tration, did not rise to the degree necessary to undercut the regulatory
nature of the statutes."' Some courts also contemplated the historical
nature of the law, but this factor carried little weight.'"
IV. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK TO GUIDE THE COURTS
Inevitably, the United States Supreme Court will rule on the con-
stitutionality of the sex offender registration statutes. In so doing, the
Court will develop a test to determine whether a particular statute
constitutes punishment. A test articulated by the Supreme Court will
305 See Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
506 See WP., 931 F. Supp. at 1211.
3117 See id, at 1211-12; Doe v, Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Artway v. Attorney
Gen., 876 F. Supp, 666, 669 (D.N tj. 1995), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir.
1996).
50I See WP, 931 F. Supp. at 1212; Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 696; Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 669.
Megan's Law provided that any action taken by a member of the public, after receiving registrant
information, including vandalism of property, verbal or written threats of harm or physical assault
against registrant, his family or employer will result in the vandal's arrest and prosecution for
criminal acts. See WP, 931 F. Supp. at 1212.
509 See Ariroay, 876 F. Supp. at 690; Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1378.
310 See Ward, 869 P.2d at 1069, 1074.
111 See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2147 (1996); WP, 931 F. Supp. at 1209.
3 L 2 See, e.g., Pataki II, 940 F. Supp. 603, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
313 See WP, 931 F. Supp. at 1214; Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
394 See WP, 931 F. Supp. at 1217; Pataki II, 940 F. Supp. at 624.
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not necessarily mean that the lower courts will apply it with uniform-
ity." To the contrary, it will most likely yield differing interpretations
resulting in different conclusions." While there is not a "bright-line"
test to determine whether a statute constitutes punishment, a uniform
framework to guide the courts should be developed.
This framework should be a patchwork of the different tests pres-
ently being employed by the lower courts and involve two parts—intent
and effects—similar to the tests used in Artway II and Doe v. Poritz. 317
Every statute must clear the threshold hurdle—whether the legisla-
ture's intent in enacting the statute was punitive. If the intent was
punitive, then the inquiry need not go any further, for the statute
should be declared punitive. If the legislative intent was nonpunitive,
the court should then determine whether the effects of the statute were
punitive in nature. This is the crux of the problem now facing the
courts and also the point where the courts diverge." Thus, this is the
area where the courts need the most guidance. The effects prong
should encompass four sub-parts, listed in order of importance: (1)
whether the statute has an alternative rational purpose, and if so,
whether the statute is excessive in relation to this alternative purpose;
(2) whether the statute serves the traditional aims of punishment—de-
terrence and retribution; (3) whether the statute imposes an affirma-
tive disability or restraint upon the registrant; and, (4) whether the
statute historically has been regarded as punishment. The courts
should consider all of these factors and accord each its relative weight.
First, every statute that has been enacted providing for sex of-
fender registration and community notification has a nonpunitive pur-
pose—to aid in the protection of the public." Although it is possible
that the registrants experience unpleasant incidental effects, these
effects do not exceed the statute's nonpunitive purposes. 32° It is dif-
ficult to estimate how many lives are saved, or how many little boys and
girls, as well as adults, are spared the horrifying ordeal of forcible rape
and/or sexual torture. If each statute saves but one of these innocent
315 Compare, e.g., Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (D. Alaska 1994) (holding that the
statute violated Ex Post Facto Clause under Mendoza-Martinez test), with Ward, 869 P.2d 1062,
1074 (holding that the statute did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause under Mendoza-Martinez test).
315 Compare, e.g., Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1380, with Ward, 869 P.2d at 1074.
317 See Artway H, 81 F.3d 1235, 1263 (3d Cir. 1996); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 388 (NJ.
1995).
31 ° Compare, e.g., WP., 931 F. Supp. at 1219, and Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 405, with Pataki
II, 940 F. Supp. at 629, and Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1378.
319 See Rowe, 884 F. Stipp. at 1379; Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
32° See WE, 991 F. Supp. at 1219.
December 19971
	 COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS	 231
victims from having to endure such a nightmare, however, the statute
will have served its purpose and should not be held to exceed its
nonpunitive goals. This Note is not endorsing every retroactive law, no
matter how punitive, that may protect the public. But, it is claiming
that when determining whether the statutes exceed their nonpunitive
purpose, the threshold of unpleasantness that the offender must. en-
dure has to rise far above mere name-calling, public humiliation and
ostracism before the statutes can be found to exceed their legitimate
goals. In California, out of 46,000 registered sex offenders the state has
received fewer than ten complaints regarding the notification provi-
sions of the statute."' The California Department of Justice has not
received any reports from law enforcement agencies indicating that
public disclosure has led to harassment, discrimination or crimes
against the registrants.3" In Oregon, the Oregon Department of Cor-
rections published a report that found that less than ten percent of
registrants subjected to community notification experienced "some
form of harassment."'" In Washington, during the first three years of
the law, a report found only fourteen incidents of harassment toward
registrants."' Although there are instances of vigilance against regis-
trants because of the community notification provisions, as noted,
these are few."' Most statutes have safeguards in effect to prevent this
very abuse."'
Second, the courts should look at whether the statutes serve both
as a deterrent and as retribution. Offenders who are not deterred by
a lengthy prison term and/or probation, a public criminal record, and
a public court hearing, will not be deterred even slightly by the possi-
bility of future public disclosure of their status as sex offenders, 327 As a
convicted sex offender stated "[w]e were well-respected in the commu-
nity . . . [and] knew the consequences, it did not stop us . . . .P9:32B As
stated above, courts should not view the public's evasive action, taken
as a result of community notification, as a deterrent, because this
approach implies that the states are punishing the offenders simply by
521 See Pataki II, 940 F. Supp. at 610.
"2 See id.
523 See id. at 610-11,
324 See id. at 610.
325 See supra notes 522-24 and accompanying text.
526 See W.F. v. Parks, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1212 (D.N.J. 1996); floe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691,
696 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Artvray v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 669 (D.N.J. 1995), affd in part,
vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
327 See Kimball, supra note 281, at 1200.
/2/ Id.
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providing the offenders with fewer innocent victims from which to
choose.
Moreover, the states did not adopt these statutes seeking retribu-
tion against the offenders. 329 The legislatures' primary intent was to aid
law enforcement agencies in their efforts to protect the public, as well
as to allow the public to protect itself. 3" Although the statutes may
bring about some retributive effects, these effects are purely inciden-
tal."' They do not rise to a sufficient level to negate the protective
purposes of the statutes."2
Similar to retribution, any disability or restraint the statutes im-
pose upon the registrants are minor consequences of the statutes."'
Most statutes limit public disclosure and impose penalties for its
abuse."4 Any interference with the lives of the registrants is merely
incidental to the statutes' legitimate goals and does not rise to the level
necessary to place the statute in the realm of punishment"'
Finally, the statutes do not involve a concept historically perceived
as punishment."6 These statutes differ significantly from the shaming
behavior historically associated with punishment." 7 The government
always had the right to warn the community about the presence of
dangerous persons."" Courts never understood such warnings to im-
pose unconstitutional punishments"
The courts should consider each of the above-mentioned factors,
accord them their respective weight and then determine, after viewing
the totality of the circumstances, whether the statute at issue constitutes
punishment and thus violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Certain statutes
may fail an ex post facto challenge because of inadequate safeguards
to protect against abuse of the registration system. Yet, overall, courts
should find that the intended purposes of the statutes greatly outweigh
any minor incidental inconveniences that the registrant may encoun-
ter.34°
529 See WP, 931 F. Supp. at 1214; State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Wash. 1994).
33° See Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp., 1372, 1379 (D. Alaska 1994); Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
331 See WP, 931 F. Supp. at 1214; Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
332 See W.P, 931 F. Supp. at 1214.
333 See Ward, 869 P.2d at 1069.
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CONCLUSION
The manner in which the issue of community notification is ad-
dressed in the lower courts consists of pooling a hodgepodge of factors
gathered from previous cases. The outcomes are determined, in large
part, by the effects of such notification statutes. Until the United States
Supreme Court rules on this issue, the varying tests will continue and
the inconsistent results will follow. Based on the different reasoning
and interpretations of the lower courts, it is unlikely that even a test
or framework developed by the Supreme Court will yield consistent
results. A "bright-line" test will not suffice to determine whether a
statute constitutes punishment, nor should a series of rigid hurdles
have to be overcome.
This Note has set forth a workable test, or guide, for determining
whether a statute constitutes punishment. The courts must view the
totality of the circumstances before reaching a decision. Although the
offenders may experience minor incidental effects due to the commu-
nity notification provisions, the overall aim of the statutes, both regu-
latory and protective, is justly served and cannot be negated by tan-
gential inconveniences to the offender. Courts must consider the
drastic consequences of striking down the community notification pro-
visions. To find that the incidental effects, such as public humiliation
and ostracism, are excessive in relation to the statutes' actual goal of
protecting the public, courts are implying that the right of registrants
to be free from the mere possibility of harassment is greater than the
rights of would-be Megan Kankas to be apprised of the presence of a
sexual predator in their midst. The Consequences of taking away the
rights of the former do not pose a significant burden upon them.
Stripping away the rights of potential victims to be made aware of the
presence of a sexual predator, however, can have horrific and perma-
nent consequences, as seen with the brutal rape and strangulation of
little Megan Kanka.
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